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Introduction 
These eventful years through which we are passing are not less 
serious for us than the Years of the Great War ... 
We see our race 
doubtful of its mission and no longer confident about its 
principles, infirm of purpose, drifting to and fro with the tides 
and currents of a deeply-disturbed ocean. The compass has 
been damaged. The charts are out of date. 
Winston Churchill. The Romanes Lecture, iqjune 193x' 
The early 1930s were a pivotal period in modern British politics and 
policy. It had already become painfully clear that Victorian and 
Edwardian conditions of prosperity. progress. and imperial power 
disrupted by the First World War could not be restored. Now the 
deeper implications of this changed environment for the character of 
British government became apparent, and could no longer be 
evaded. The extension of the electorate, increased strength of the 
Labour movement, and adjustments in the party system from 1918, 
had also left unresolved problems about the role and finance of 
government, and about the distribution of political power. Two 
years of intense difficulty and uncertainty culminated in the greatest 
peacetime crisis in Britain this century. that of August to October 
1931. The longer-term effects were a new political pattern, new 
bases for economic and imperial policy, and new conceptions about 
the role of the state. These formed the political, administrative, and 
intellectual context within which British policy was reshaped during 
and after the Second World War. 
During 1931 the party system underwent a major and lasting 
reconstruction. The Labour party which MacDonald, Henderson. 
Snowden, Clones, and Thomas had made into a party of government 
'' Parliamrntarv Government and the Economic- Problem', in N tnuton C: hurchill. Tkomi; k1j 
oad AdvraJrns m2 , 24o. 
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during the 1920S suffered a split leadership, a disastrous departure 
from office, and parliamentary devastation. Its expectation of stead 
political advance was destroyed, its strategies of ' grad ualism 
' and 
accommodation to existing political conventions were 
discredited. 
The Liberal party, divided and weakened by the war and then 
reduced to third-party status in the early 1 c)2os, had 
been 
surrendered acrimoniously by Asquith to Lloyd George and 
Samuel 
in 1926-- 7. After a period of revival it obtained its long-craved re- 
entry into government, only to disintegrate finally into three 
irreconcilable splinters and to disappear as it substantial par- 
liamentary force. The Conservative party of' Baldwin and Neville 
Chamberlain endured its own period of severe internal differences. 
It then obtained surprising allies in the two largest Liberal sections 
and three Labour leaders within it National government headed by 
the socialist, MacDonald. In a remarkable general election coup in 
October 1931 this National government obtained massive as- 
cendancy over a newly radicalised Labour part\ led l)\ Lansbur\, 
Attlee, Cripps, Dalton, Morrison. and by the 'It'C leaders. Begin 
and Citrine. The politics of' 'national unite' had swamped the 
politics of `socialism'. 
Many political careers lay in ruins, including those not just of 
former Labour ministers and MPs but also, it seemed, of' Lloyd 
George, Mosley, Amen, and Churchill. Ofthe three parts leaders in 
the late 1920s -- MacDonald, Baldwin, and I loyd George only 
Baldwin survived 1931 at the head of his party . 
The recurrent 
electoral uncertainty, parliamentary complications, and govern- 
mental instability of the three-party system of the I()20S had been 
replaced for the 193os by the lesser insecurities of a two-bloc 
alignment of the `National' allies as against the Labour party. This 
arrangement persisted despite subsequent differences within each 
bloc and cross-fertilisation between them during the international 
crisis of the late 193os and in the war coalition of the early 1(14()s- 
Thereafter it solidified into the highly resilient two-party. 
C: 
on- 
servative-Labour, system which, despite challenges in the i O7os and 
ig8os, has survived into the present. 
In economic policy, efforts made during the rct2os to restore the 
pre-1914 international financial and commercial system collapsed 
during 1931 and 1932. The gold standard the regime ()f 'a stable 
pound and fixed exchange rates re-established in i q27- had finally 
to he abandoned. After almost a hundred years, and f{, Iluwing three 
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decades of' political assault inspired by Joseph Chamberlain, free 
trade was renounced and tariff protection imposed by Neville 
Chamberlain. In domestic finance, on the other hand, the 1931 crisis 
resulted in substantial reversion to pre-1914 conceptions of budget- 
ary rectitude and fiscal apportionment between social classes. All 
classes were obliged to make some contribution towards balancing 
the budget, and the direct taxation net was spread more widely than 
ever before. Nevertheless the burden of impositions fell not so much 
progressively against wealth through taxation; as regressively 
against low. -er incomes through retrenchment;. All unemployment 
benefits and state ., ages. salaries and fees were cut at a stroke. The 
growth of central government social service expenditure had been 
temporarily checked. Despite an unemployment rate of around 20 
per cent the idea that government could and should spend 
substantial sums of money to create employment was defeated. Yet 
this victory for 'sound' public finance obscured important shifts in 
monetary, commercial, agricultural, and industrial policies towards 
state assistance and stimulus to private enterprise. Outside the 
government more explicit dirigicte ideas, of state management and 
planning, became deeply entrenched, while Keynes moved towards 
the full development of his theory and policy prescriptions. 
Imperial relationships were also readjusted, in calculated relax- 
ations of' British control. The self-governing 'white' Dominions 
ceased to belong to the British Empire and became members of a 
British Commonwealth. As embodied in the 1931 Statute of 
Westminster this C ommon., wealth was regarded in Britain not as a 
retreat from Empire but as a British-led partnership. As trade and 
finance %%-ere considered to he the essential underpinnings for this 
new relationship, the establishment of an imperial preference system 
and a sterling bloc had profound political as well as economic 
significance. Meanwhile the British Empire in India -a miscel- 
laneous collection of British provinces and dependent Native States, 
all still governed by some measure of autocracy -- underwent a 
process of constitutional reform. This sought to establish, by means 
of Round Table conferences, a similar British-managed partnership 
based upon co-operation with moderate nationalists and princes in 
representative governments and an All-India Federation. These two 
movements, towards the British Commonwealth and Indian 
Federation, provoked the emergence of a new imperialist resistance. 
especially within the Conservative party. It therefore mattered a 
4 
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great deal for the success of those two movements that the 
Labour government was succeeded not by a Conservative govern- 
ment, heavily reliant upon diehard imperialist support, 
but by a 
broad National coalition tipped towards moderate opinion. 
These events of the early t 93os are not only 
important in 
themselves. They are also important because since the 
late 193os 
they have been interpreted in was which give them a special place 
in common understandings of the shape of twentieth-century 
British 
history. The Munich crisis, the Second World War, the Churchill 
coalition, the Beveridge Report and the 'Keynesian' 
White Paper 
on Employment Policy, the 1945 Labour election victory, and two 
decades of `full employment': these in various combinations cast a 
dark shadow over the politics and policies of the 1 g3os. 
For 
Churchill, 1931 was the beginning of the 'locust years'. In his 
version of events, MacDonald 'brooded supinely' and 
Baldwin 
`reigned placidly' at the head of a 'so-called National Government' 
that 'steadfastly closed [its] eves and ears' to the rise of the dictators 
and challenges to British power. ' More influential still have been 
amalgams of this Churchillian view with either Labour or Keynesian 
interpretations, or even a fusion of all three. Here criticism 
broadened to include a supposed inertness in the face of depression 
and mass unemployment, which seemed all of a piece with the foreign 
policy record. ' During the prosperous l 95os and 1 g6os such views 
became standard. Robert Skidelskv, for instance, declared that the 
failure of governments in the early i g3os to overcome the economic 
problem 'helped create a mood of national self-doubt, of pessimism 
regarding the future, in which appeasement could flourish'. The 
'refusal to stand up to the dictators was part of the refusal to stand 
up to unemployment', it `required Dunkirk to give the British faith 
in themselves again'. 4 
Since the 196os reassessments of appeasement and the economic 
problems of the 193os have qualified such interpretations, softening 
their hard outlines. Yet the crucial events of the early 1930S which 
were once seen as blighting the rest of that decade have not received 
comprehensive examination. This does not mean that the period has 
2 Winston Churchill, The Second World War. Val. 1 The Gathering 
. 
Storm t94ä , 
6t> 1. b4,66. 
also 71,76--7,80. 
' For earl versions see 'Cato' [Michael Foot. Peter Howard, and Frank Owen), Grt[g' Mee 
1940 , 16-26, and A. L. Rowse, The End cf an Fporh 1947 . 
The latter cotuists of essav-s 
written between 1938 and 1946, whose heroes arr Churchill. Keynes, and Bevin Robert Skidelskv, Politicians and the Slump. The Labour Goternment of toxý- tnyt tg6; ,, 386- 7 
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been neglected. On the contrary, certain aspects of it have attracted 
great controversy and historical scholarship of the highest quality. 
For many years interest concentrated upon the 1931 political 
crisis. As its most spectacular features issued from a split within the 
Labour Cabinet, the principal problem seemed to be ascribing 
responsibility for that division. From the moment the Labour 
Cabinet fell and the National government was announced this 
question of responsibility became a central issue. Fought largely 
between members and former members of the Labour party, the 
debate was embittered by an election campaign and produced 
disclosures which meant that a great deal became known, or rather 
disputed, about Cabinet proceedings. As the Labour party was 
considerably more substantial and enduring than MacDonald's 
National Labour group, and seemed to receive justification in its 
political successes of the 194os, the interpretations of its members 
became orthodox. Labour charges of a 'bankers' ramp's - that 
British or American bankers had 'dictated' cuts in unemployment 
benefits and contrived the Labour government's downfall - and of 
various sorts of 'betrayal' of the Labour movement and the working 
class by Snowden, Thomas, and especially MacDonald. came to 
overshadow accusations that Henderson and his supporters had 'run 
away' from their ministerial responsibilities under pressure from 
TL'C 'dictation'. MacDonald was said to have been perverted by 
deficient principles or seduced by an 'aristocratic embrace' into a 
long meditated desertion or 'plot' dating, perhaps, from his appeal 
in June 1929 for a' Council of State', if not earlier. Sidney Webb's 
account published in 1932 became the first of a series of memoirs by 
ex-Cabinet ministers which combined selective amnesia with 
creative recollection. Herbert Morrison's were the most out- 
rageous. " Labour intellectuals - Woolf, Laski, and Jennings - added 
the notion of a 'constitutional revolution'. especially that the King 
had been responsible for, or had lent himself to ' undemocratic' 
action when he appointed a partyless MacDonald to head the 
This phrase was invented and used during the August tq,; t crisis bv the Otv and Night 
educe` of the Dativ Herald : we Francis Williams, . 
%otkrºtg . ta Stran e.. 4* . 4rr1obtegr hr i q7o 
Joy 
Sidney Webb Lord Passfield 
. 
'What Happened in 19,1 t. A Record'. Politual Qrarter(r. 3 
1932 . 1 17 . 
Momson. a Mat Donaldite up to October IQ-31. later resorted to outright 
fiction in order to present himself as a leading anti-Macl)onaldite during the August cries: 
we hi s' recollections ' recorded in Haruki `icolson. A rag Georg# the F, /M (hereafter George I'1 
114.52 467: Herbert Morrixm. (: orvnrsvrrl and Parltam, *t 1954 . 78. and 
Herben 
Morrison, 
. 
4* 
. 
4rtobtograpln -i quo .i zti ;. 
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National government. ' The idea of a MacDonald 'plot' %vas 
reinforced by Snowden's : lutobiographv, where malice against 
MacDonald overshadow ed malice against the Labour opponents, 
and by a bizarrely vicious account by 
MacDonald's former 
parliamentary private secretary. " 
Such interpretations for long exercised an important influence 
upon Labour politics. In 1943 the Bank of'England, dismayed to 
find 
Labour Cabinet ministers still perpetuating the 'bankers' ramp 
accusation, compiled a detailed account of its own role during the 
crisis for non-attributable use in 'dispel[ling] misconceptions'. 
' The 
Bank nevertheless became the first institution nationalised by the 
1945 Labour government, even though eflectiye control of'monetary 
policy had already passed to the Treasury in the immediate 
aftermath of the 1931 crisis. Fear of evoking unpleasant and 
damaging parallels with MacDonald's ' betrayal' inhibited Labour 
party leaders from resorting to cross-party co-operation in later 
periods ofdificulty. Through such political obsessions and associated 
writings, the terms of the 1931 party conflict, however diluted or 
modified, for long determined the form of historical accounts. They 
were, at first, unshaken by Harold Nicolson's sensible account in his 
biography of king George V. based upon the Royal Archives and 
access to certain Cabinet papers and Bank of England documents. "' 
If only because of the constrictions of abridged description, their 
residue can still be found in recent historical writings. 
Reassessment was begun by Reginald Bassett, a XlacDonaldite of 
1931 writing as a political scientist in 1958. He understood that the 
key to an explanation of' the t g3 i crisis was a reliable, detailed 
narrative. He used this to explode the absurdities of'earlier accounts, 
Leonard Woolf. 'A Constitutional Resolution'. Palºlual Qluarler/1.2 I(j3I . 37.1 ; 
Ivor 
Jennings, The Constitution under Strain', ibid., ty. 32 . 1q. 1 tot; 
Harold l. askº, The 
(. nsº+ and the (. onsutlutzon 19: j2 
Philip. Viscount Snossden. An : lulohºoRraphr ºt, I'M . 92( 7)8, 
I. MacNeill Weir, 7hß 
Tragedy of Ramsal . 
tfacDonald 1(4.38. Weir wrote his first draft during ºq-; 2, seeking 
material from Lloyd George see W1'cir to l. losd George, 21 June, 7 juls 19132, and to 
Sylvester. it Aug. 18,32, L(; (; /33/:, '42 . 43.4.1 
But Lloyd (; rorgr was wars and oflcrrd 
little help, and Weir could find no publisher for such a strident attack until after MacDonald's death. 
&>E: C: te. 1o March, q June, 1i Aug 1443. and Norman to Sir Horace %%'ilsln, to Aug. 
1943, BoE G14/31t;. This actiyits was precipitated hs statements made by the Home Secretary, Morrison who during the 1931 crisis itself had given no sign of believing in ans 'bankers' ramp'.. The result was a j1-page memo bs Thompson-McCausland. '"The Gnus 
of July-September 1931 ', used in chs. 8t1 below. 
Nicolson, George 1'. 453-69. For Nicolson being allowed to we the vital telegram of 23 August tg31 from New York hankers, set- BoE Ctr, to Aug. 1944, in &, E: 614/'06. 
R 
9 
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and to demonstrate that the differences between the two sections of 
the Labour Cabinet were much narrower than had been asserted. " 
However, as most documentary sources were then still unavailable, 
he could only speculate about motives. Following the opening of the 
public archives and with full access to MacDonald's papers. David 
Maryuand's biography of MacDonald produced an impressive and 
convincing interpretation both of MacDonald himself and of his part 
in the crisis. He displayed not only "MacDonald's vanity and 
disillusionment but also his sense of duty and honour, his courage, 
hard work, and resourcefulness, and his genuine attempts to get 
things done and . prove the 
Labour party's 'fitness to govern '. 12 So far 
had rehabilitation of MacDonald proceeded that his Labour 
opponents now seemed neglected. A recent reappraisal of' Hender- 
son, however, has presented his actions as 'in the deepest sense, 
patriotic', in that his objective was to 'keep Labour moderate'. " 
Accounts of' the political crisis had long concentrated upon the 
Labour party. Autobiographies and biographies of Conservative 
and Liberal leaders and histories of their parties supplied important 
details, and showed how each had faced serious internal party 
problems after the inconclusive 1929 general election. Yet since from 
both Conservative and Liberal perspectives it seemed easy to regard 
entry into a National government as a straightforward matter of 
acting in the 'national interest ', their role had not been treated as 
problematic. More recently, however, their activities have attracted 
detailed attention. One interpretation supposed that a Labour - 
Liberal failure to establish a parliamentary alliance enabled Neville 
Chamberlain successfully to mastermind a' Conservative Party bid 
fir power' in August i y;; i ." 
In contrast it has been argued that until 
a late stage no one could have expected advantage from joining a 
National government, and emphasis has been placed upon the 
importance of the Liberal leadership's role during its formation. " It 
Ii R. Bassett. Ncneteen 7hcrtti-on, Political (: nsi, ict., ü For ht, Macl)omaldism, scc Bassctt to 
Allen. ly Ikt ty.; ', in Martin Gilbert rd . 
Plough 
. 
tli Our Furrou. The. , 
titon' ol 1. oºd. 411e+r 
01 Hurtuood tc)tr) . 115 
h. ti I)a\id Marquand. Ramsat 
. 
UaiDoRald tg;; 
Andrew Thorpe. 'Arthut Henderson and ihr British Political (: rtsis of 193' Htstonral 
Journal. 3tt gRR ,ii;,; 4, at t t;, t ,; 
R v See almý Andrrs. Thorpe. The British Gewtºt! 
Election o/ ry?! Oxford. it . 
, 
John Fair, 'The (ýc)nscr%ativr Basis for thc Formation of thr National Government in 
t y3' '. joarwal of Bntuh tittrdu,. ' ct 14811 , 14-2 tý. t. at 143. 
Fair. 'The Second Labour 
. 
Government and the Politics of F. In toral IZefiorm, 1424 31 ', . 
41bt04,13 1981 - 276-301 David Wrench, "'Cashing ln-ý The Partirs and thr National Government August 
t g3 t September 1432'. josrrnal o/ British . ttudrn. :,; I (A4 , ';; S a3. 
13 
14 
I6 
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has also been shown that Conservative leaders, far from seizing 
power in August 1931, wanted the Labour Cabinet to remain 
in 
office for the duration of the immediate financial crisis. Again, 
though, no special problem is seen about their ultimate decision : 
joining the National government seemed `the only possible solution', 
a matter of `patriotic duty'. " 
Meanwhile, another form of interpretation had developed. Here 
the explanation for the Labour government's collapse lay not in the 
circumstances of the 1931 crisis, but in its longer-term failure since 
taking office in 1929 to tackle the economic problem effectively. This 
approach was foreshadowed as intra-party polemic by Woolf and 
Tawnev, and as history by another Labour intellectual, Cole. For 
these, the failure was one of insufficient 'socialism'. '' The approach 
received its fullest development in the writings of Skidelsky, but for 
him the failure lay in the nature of `socialism'. He argued initially 
that 'socialism' had been 'Utopian' and 'nebulous', with 'nothing 
constructive to offer the present ', 18 and later that it had been fatally 
rooted in orthodox nineteenth-century political culture and liberal 
economic assumptions, including that of the continuing viability of 
free-trade capitalism. 1e Both versions have great historiographical 
importance. The 'real story' of inter-war domestic politics becomes 
not the struggle between the political parties or between socialism 
and capitalism, but that between 'economic conservatives' and 
'economic radicals'. It is assumed that 'all policies' turned upon the 
issue of mass unemployment. Effective means to create employment 
are said to have been available in 'interventionist' capitalism, as 
expressed in the ideas of Keynes and those politicians influenced by 
him. 20 
Skidelskv's approach broadened and deepened analysis, con- 
nected political with economic history, and exhumed two previously 
neglected `Keynesian' programmes: Lloyd George's loan-financed 
public works schemes of 1929--3o and Xlosley's national development 
16 Stuart Ball, 'The Conservative Party and the Formation of the National Government: 
August 1931 ', Historical Journal, 29 ; 1986 , 159-82. at 162: Ball. Baldwin and te Conseniatim Party. The Crises of l92y- j9? ' New Haven and London, ig88.. chapter q. Woolf, 'A Constitutional Revolution', 475 : R. H. 7 awnev, The Choice Before the Labour Party', Political Quarterly, 3 1932 , 323--45; C. D H. Cole, Heston of the Labour Party From 
1914 1948 , 255-8 
1" Skidelsky, Politicians, xii. 27,394-5. Skidelsky, ' 1929-1931 Revisited', Bulletin of the . 
Sonett' for the Stndy of Labour Hutory, 2t 1970,6-7; Skidelsky, 'The Reception of the Keynesian Revolution', in Milo Keynes 
ed. ', Essays on John Maynard Keynes Cambridge 1975 , 
84-1o7; and Skidelsky, Oswald Mosley '1975.,, 54-6. 
Skidelsky, Politicians. xi-xii, 387, and see Skidelsky 'Reception of the Keynesian Revolution', 0; -102. 
17 
19 
20 
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and international 'insulation' plans of 1930-3 1. At a time when 
Keynesian economics still seemed a body of almost self-evident 
truths, this emphasis upon the centrality of a `Keynesian' solution to 
unemployment also pervaded the works of historians of economic 
policy. 21 
Ross McKibbin was the first to suggest that matters were more 
complicated. 'Keynesianism', he argued, did not offer a real choice 
because it had yet to become a coherent policy position, would have 
required fiscal and administrative leverage which the state did not 
then have, and, given the existing structure of power, would have 
faced insuperable political obstacles. In his view, the Labour 
government's effective choice lay only between drift and deflation. 
In clinging to the former it became so financially unorthodox that it 
helped manufacture its own collapse. 22 Thereafter, a broader debate 
about inter-war economic policy - stimulated by the `end of 
Keynesianism' and radical changes in national policy during the 
late 197os and i 98os - issued in a revisionism which from an 
economic direction gave analytical depth to what some had intuited 
from the political end. It has been argued that the unemployment 
problem was more diverse and more resistant to macroeconomic 
'management' than Keynesians had supposed, and that if Lloyd 
George's and Mosley's public works programmes had been imple- 
mented their effect would have been limited, and possibly counter- 
productive. 23 It has also been argued that the Treasury's resistance 
to the claims of Keynes, Lloyd George, and Mosley was economically 
and politically intelligent, and emphasised that it had priorities other 
than reduction of unemployment. " Donald Moggridge, in a 
U See, e. g , 
Donald Winch, Ecoaowtuj and Polu. j t96q . and 
Susan Howson and Donald 
Winch, The Ecowoauc 
. 
4drsson Coat" : 47cr ig j Cambridge, 1977 ; also W. H. janewav, 
'The Economic Poll(-N of the Second Labour Government, 1929--31 ', Cambridge Ph. D. 
thesis, 19 71 
Ross McKihbin, 'The Economic Polic% of the Second Labour Government 1929-1931', 
Past and Presexi, 68 1975 95-123, reprinted in McKibben, T7a ldrologtes o% Class. Sons/ 
Rilateoas in Bntaa'885-ty5o Oxford, 1990 , 197-227. 
See esp. Alan Booth and Sean Glynn, 'Unemployment in the Interwar Period'. Joaawal of 
Caetnaporary Huron, 10 1975 , 
61 1- 
. 
36. Sean Ghnn and P. G A. Howells, 'Unemployment 
in the 143(36'. Aeutralsaa &owonnc Huton Rerun, 20 1480.28-45, Scan Glynn and Alan 
Booth. 'Unemployment in Interwar Britain', Ecoasoac Hutort Rrrrar, 26 19-83`, 32q'-48, T. 
Thomas. 'Aggregate Demand in the United Kingdom 1918-45'. in R. loud and D. 
McCloskey ? eds. The F. cotasnc Hutort of Britain sacs t7 Cambridge, 1981', 332-46, and 
we the debate in Scan Glynn and Alan Booth eds-', The Road to Full Erwplorauwt ". 198; 
Especially Roger Middleton, 'The Trrasur in the 19305', Oxford F. cowoauu Papers, 34 
1982:, 48-77; Middleton, 'The Treasury and Public Investment', Plrblw . 
4dmzaistratsaa, 61 
1983 " 351 70, and 
Middleton, l owerdt the , 
4lassagnd Ecowoan 1985 ; George Peden. 'The 
"ireasun. - View" on Public Works and Employment in the Interwar Period', Ecoaewc 
Huron Rni. 'u , 37 ; 1484 167-81 . 
u 
n 
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Keynesian critique of' monetary policy, nevertheless demonstrated 
that the Bank of England's position was more sensitive and 
sophisticated than Governor Norman's notorious evidence to the 
Macmillan Committee had suggested, a conclusion which R. S. 
Sayers elaborated and confirmed. 25 In a major riposte to the 
revisionist trend, Peter Clarke revealed how 
Keynes's 
challenges 
forced the financial authorities to examine their assumptions and 
reconstruct their justifications. He also made important methodo- 
logical advances, showing that understanding demands attention to 
how the economic argument developed in specific contexts over 
time, and appreciation that in crucial aspects it was also a political 
argument. 26 
In contrast to the party-political and economic issues, imperial 
and international policies have aroused less scholarly controversy. 
Nevertheless work in this area has demonstrated that there was a 
fierce debate between internationalist and imperialist economic 
policies ; 27 that earlier descriptions of* the foundation of the British 
Commonwealth as deliberate constitutional 'evolution ' towards 
independent states were a mythology ; '" and that the political and 
financial problems which Britain faced in India were partly self- 
inf7icted. 29 These studies have added conceptions of- a 'crisis' in 
Dominion relations and a 'crisis' of' Indian unity to those 'crises' 
detected by other historians in domestic economic, sterling, and 
budget policies, within the Conservative, Liberal, and Labour 
parties, and of the party system as a whole. Almost as important, but 
generally overlooked, is Ronald Butt's view- that 'a high tide of 
criticism of the existing parliamentary system occurred in iqlq 
31 30 
These various `crises' in party politics, policy, and government 
have been studied in some depth, but due to the compartmentali- 
sation of much historical interest they have also been studied more 
or less in isolation. Yet these problems did not bear upon 
contemporary political leaders in isolation, nor did they just happen 
V. Donald Moggridge. British 
. 
tfonrtary Polin 1924 rq; r (: ambridgr. 1971 , R. S. Savers. Thr BanA of England rfkjc-1944 Cambridge, 1c17fi . Peter Clarke, The li'rynesian Revolution in the Making IW4 - c93, Oxford. 1988 E. g., Ian Drummond, Imperial Lconomu Policy 1917 1919 1974 , and 
Robert Boyce, Bnti h Capitalism at the Crossroads 1! )1q- I9' 2 Cambridge, 1987 
See esp. John Darwin, 'Imperialism in Dec line. ' 'I cndcncit"s in British Imperial Policy between the Wars', Historical 
, 
journal, 1"; ty8c, . b_ 74, and R. F. Holland, Britain and dw Commonwealth Alliance i i8-ig39 , 1981 . R. J. Moore, The Crisis of Indian ('ratty tyt; --ty4o Oxford, 1974 Ronald Butt, The Pou-er of Parliament 1 qb ,. 1 18. 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
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to coincide: they became interconnected, and they reacted upon 
each other. They were parts of a general, delayed, aftermath of the 
First World War, representing the breakdown of the first attempts 
made between iqt8 and 1925 to adjust to its multiple effects : the 
disruption of the nineteenth-century international economic and 
financial systems, a sharp increase in colonial nationalist feeling, and 
mass working-class enfranchisement and the possibility of socialist 
government. Between certain aspects of these problems there were 
substantive links. But connections were also created by politicians, as 
they took up particular issues in the course of advancing wider policy 
or party objectives. 
As the economy failed to conform to pre-1914 patterns, as the 
principal imperial possessions declined to accept continued sub- 
ordination, as the party system seemed locked in persistent 
compromises, and as political leaders tried to cope with the ensuing 
difficulties, there was a period of severe strains and deep uncertainty. 
It became apparent to a growing number of public figures that 
previous assumptions. arrangements, and expectations - Churchill's 
'compass' and 'charts' had become useless or obsolete. Increas- 
ingly it was thought and said that fundamental readjustments might 
have to he made. Doubts were even raised about the effectiveness of 
the institutions of government, including Parliament. The resulting 
atmosphere contributed to a transformation in British government. 
in its personnel, policy. power, and potential. 
If these changes are to be understood, each important element in 
the political system -- whether a party or a policy -. has to be assessed 
in relation to the other important elements. From this perspective it 
is clear that although foreign policy. especially the issue of 
disarmament, was a large government concern and at an executive 
level mattered a great deal to MacDonald and Henderson, it did not 
form a central issue and had only marginal effects upon the course 
of political change. Consequently it makes only intermittent 
appearances in the present study. 31 On the other hand it becomes 
plain that the economic problem was not the all-engrossing issue it 
is often presumed to have been. Many politicians treated the Indian 
problem as almost as important. if not more so. Although it was 
possible to believe that the economy might soon recover, in India 
manv lives were at immediate risk and loss of control there would be 
a permanent blow to British prestige and power. Contrary to 
For a valuaMc stud%- ofthcsr aspect-i. src David Carlton. . 
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another common impression, it also becomes apparent that even 
within economic affairs unemployment was never the predominant 
issue around which all other policies turned. It was always a 
subordinate matter, secondary to a 'sound' currency, a balanced 
budget, debt management, industrial efficiency and business 
confidence, free trade or tariffs. Even trade unions considered 
employment subordinate to the maintenance of existing 
levels of 
wages and unemployment benefits. 
One effect of studying different elements separately has been that 
each part has not always been fully understood. This is especially 
true where `politics' and ' policy' overlap. For instance, as makers of* 
Indian policy, Simon and Hoare have been criticised as ' trim- 
mers ... who placed personal and party considerations above 
prin- 
ciple'. 32 This statement may contain much truth, yet it is certain 
that Hoare, for instance, would never have steered the federation 
scheme past Conservative imperialists if he had not shown the closest 
attention to party management and his personal position. Mis- 
understanding is still more frequent in policy studies b\ economists 
and economic historians.: great deal of such literature on the inter- 
war period rests upon an assumption that policy was, or should have 
been, determined by economic and financial experts on economic 
and financial merits. It can be granted that the financial authorities 
and economic interests helped to shape the culture of politics and 
government, and imposed certain constraints upon policy. Never- 
theless, such literature fails either to grasp the primacy of politics in 
issues of government, or to display a genuine sense of the character 
of political activity. 
Politics inevitably entered into the fundamental concerns of the 
experts. Clarke has shown how political prepossessions and par- 
ticipation crucially affected the development of Keynes's economic 
thinking, and similar things can clearly be said of the Treasury and 
the Bank of England. 33 Politics obviously became central at the level 
of economic and financial policy decisions which, in most cases, 
were a matter of power relationships negotiated by politicians. These 
politicians had their own economic conceptions, however callow. 
More important, they also had constantly to concern themselves 
with other areas of police, with the management of opinion, and 
32 Moore. Crisis of Indian Unit), 20(4. 
Clarke, Keynesian Reaolut: on, esp. ch. 4, and see his rarhrr essas, .I he Politics of Kr 'nrstan Economics 1924 1931 ', in Michael BentlrN and John Sirs rnson eds.. High anti/ l as Polctt<< 
in Modern Britain 'Oxford, ! q8'3 . 
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with party objectives. Yet policy studies are often confined to the 
records of officials and economists, as if policy happened in a world 
divorced from that of politics, except for occasional, unpleasant, 
intrusions of some undefined 'political expediency'. ' Alternatively. 
politics are reduced to a puppet show manipulated by officials. 
economists, and pressure groups. 
In reality political activity was not some obscure monolithic force. 
but a matter of constantly shifting disagreement, debate, and 
persuasion over both fundamentals and details. It was not a passive 
reflection of `interests' or inert implementation of advice, but a 
largely autonomous activity with its own complex priorities. 
procedures, and languages. So, for instance, if the unemployment 
policy debate of early 1C92c9 is to he properly understood, it matters 
a great deal that it took place in the run-up to a general election. 
Similarly the introduction of protection will not be understood if it 
is assumed that politicians who had spent half a lifetime believing in 
tariff reform needed to be led in that direction by businessmen. 
officials, and economists. 
A common distortion in the study of' economic policy - rather 
than in the distinct study of the development of economic thinking 
is that economists receive a prominence altogether disproportion- 
ate to their actual importance. In such works the only Henderson 
who appears to he significant is Hubert, the economist not Arthur. 
the politician. Yet Arthur Henderson, despite being Foreign 
Secretary from 1929 to 1931. always had more weight than Hubert 
Henderson whenever he intervened in economic policy. More 
remarkable is the attention given to Keynes, which is on a scale 
explicable only in terms of his subsequent influence. Contemporary 
politicians might have considered that Keynes had valuable economic 
ideas, but within the whole context of assessing the practicality of 
policies -- a judgement necessarily extending well beyond economics 
he was of no more importance than, say, leading backbench MPs 
or the editors of The 'limes, . 
btu-. s (. hroniclr, or Daih Herald. In this 
sense the space given to Keynes in the present study remains 
excessive. Nevertheless it seems 
. 
justified for the negative purpose of 
34 To take only the most recent example, cre the lists of what is considered relevant in WR 
Gantde. British 1'wereplayeniret ty, p i9 p .4 
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showing that his contributions to policy debate could 
he ambiguous 
or unhelpful, and that rejection of' his views 
did not necessarily 
denote prejudice or stupidity. 'T'hen again, confusion arises 
if 
Keynes's ideas are assumed to be the standard for what constitutes 
economic ' radicalism', 'intervention', or 'management'. 
" Other 
versions existed, most notably Conservative imperial protectionism 
which offered an alternative, if much less sophisticated, political 
economy. By 1929 the real economic issues lay not between 'laissez- 
faire' and 'intervention', but between different forms and degrees of 
radical intervention. L6 
It is true that certain policies were treated as 'non -poll tical ', and 
left to the experts. Here non-political records obviously do provide 
most of' the relevant source-material. Monetary policy is the chief 
example. Until August 19, E t this almost never entered even into 
Cabinet deliberations, with the result that most political leaders 
remained ignorant of' the issues and potentially at the mercy of 
officials. As Passfield said, notoriously, after suspension of' the gold 
standard. ' nobody even told its we could do that '.: " Yet such matters 
were 'non-political' only in the sense that they were taken out of' 
politicians' hands. In a deeper sense these arrangements were highly 
political, representing the supremacy of' a particular political- 
economic dispensation. This was true of' the gold standard, and it 
can be seen again after 1931, when Conservative ministers placed 
tariffs and later unemployment relief in the hands of' new 'non- 
political' agencies. 
This book begins in 1926 and ends in 1932 not merely because 
that period encompasses the 1 ct,; i crisis, but because it has a distinct 
coherence. It stretches from the realisation that the gold standard 
was not operating smoothly to the establishment of new monetary 
arrangements, and from a free trade to a protectionist regime. The 
1926 Imperial Conference defined the notion of Commonwealth, 
and that of 1932 determined its economic arrangements. Lord Irwin. 
the principal force behind Indian constitutional reform, became 
35 Alan Booth, 'Britain ºn thr ty3os. A \fanat; rd f. tonomN F'Lonomº, Maori, Ret-ºru. ¢t, 
1987.49q develops this criticism 
The point is fort rfulls made in Robert Self. Jn, trý and Jarzff% 1hr Gnn, erratºrr Part) and tht Politic% of Tarff Reform /r)22- r((,; 2 Ness York and London. I(48v) , xxüt xxs 
Skidrlsks, 
'Reception of the Keynesian Resolution', to:. and Skidelsks, . 
tlotileº'. , ºtº H. had earlier 
accepted the salience of tariff reform before tqt, }. but ignored its inter-war (: cºnserx-atise 
manifestations. 
This is the 'ersion originally- recordrd in Dalton diary, t z, )au tq; 1. The phrase was then 
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Viceroy in 1926, in t 932 the decisions were taken to persist with the 
process he had begun. The period also extends from one period of 
Conservative predominance to another. 
A less obvious source of coherence, but in some senses the crucial 
one, is provided by the Liberal party. Except as generators of radical 
economic ideas Liberals are not often considered to be of much 
significance beyond 1924, when they failed to re-establish themselves 
as a party of government. It is generally said that their 'downfall' 
had already occurred, and that their attempted revival at the 1929 
election was a failure. Yet being a self-sufficient party of government 
does not constitute the sole criterion of importance. nor is regaining 
such a position the only meaningful party aspiration. After Lloyd 
George became Liberal leader in 1926 the party enjoyed an 
increased share of the popular vote, and an advance from 
parliamentary powerlessness to possession of the balance of power. 
Later it became a major if divided partner in the National 
government. Even though the contests between the smaller and the 
two larger parties were unequal. the period from 1926 to 1932 was 
nonetheless one of genuine three-party politics. The existence of a 
'hung' Parliament between the t 92q and 1931 elections had large 
consequences for the party struggle and for national policy. ss 
For the Conservative and Labour parties, the Liberal revival of 
the late 1 c)2OS greatly complicated the chief problem of modern 
government. This was the problem of obtaining sufficient assent 
from a mass electorate . largely poorly informed, and overwhelm- 
ingly working-class - for policies which were difficult to comprehend, 
which lacked a sensational appeal. or, most seriously, which might 
involve material sacrifice from large numbers of voters. Throughout 
the inter-war period there was much anxiety about whether 
democracy could be persuaded to face 'the truth'. and be dissuaded 
from succumbing to irresponsible 'stunts'. The leaderships of both 
major parties initially reacted to the Liberal revival by compromising 
their own preferred policies and seeking to undercut it through 
appeals to moderate opinion. With the collapse of the Liberal party 
in 1931 2, they felt more freedom in asserting their own versions of 
radicalism. 
Within the period 1926 to 1932 this book is organised around two 
shorter periods, which receive close examination as foci for the 
One common indication cif inattention to the Liberals is that in accounts of the last weeks 
of the Latour gnvrrnmeni they are dm-rihrd as an 'opposition party, which altogether 
misunderstands the Liberal lradrrshiv'\ txnition. 
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several strands of exposition and argument. The importance of the 
later sub-period, from mid July to late October 1931, is self-evident: 
it was that of manifest financial and political crisis. Here explanation 
demands detailed attention to chronology, as a series of major and 
complex changes occurred in every part of the political system. 
During those months nothing remained constant and predictable. 
The sterling crisis, for instance, passed through several phases, while 
attitudes towards the idea of 'national government' changed week 
by week, and sometimes day by day. 
The earlier sub-period, from October to early December 1930, has 
not previously been regarded as one of general importance. Yet 
during those months the notion of ' national crisis' took firm hold, 
both as a description of substantive problems and as an instrument 
in political conflict. This not only remained an ingredient in high 
politics during the following year. it also created a wider public 
atmosphere of'crisis' which helped make the electorate so responsive 
to the National government's appeal at the 1931 general election. 
During this period too, the idea of 'national government' itself 
became established, some ten months before the National govern- 
ment was actually formed. 
These early coalition ideas have been treated in one of two ways, 
either as evidence of a conspiracy or premeditated betrayal by 
MacDonald or, more recently, as unimportant because having no 
relevance to contemporary politics -' the only national combina- 
tions formed in the autumn of 1930 were those scribbled on the backs 
of menus at select dinner parties'. 39 Both views misunderstand the 
character and significance of the 'national government ' idea. In the 
first place, the National government of August 1931 was not that 
envisaged by any political leaders in autumn 1930. This was most 
certainly true of MacDonald. Second, any serious consideration of 
suspension of party conflict is an important indicator of severe strain 
in the political system, particularly of a perceived gap between the 
scale of policy problems and the ability of government to cope with 
them. In this sense the discussions of autumn 1930 were similar to 
those during the constitutional crisis of 1910 and the Irish crisis of 
1914, or during the First World War crises of 1915 and 19 16. Third, 
these discussions were relevant even though they might appear to have borne little relation to contemporary party positions. Politics 
19 Skidelsky, Politicians, ley; see also Ball, The Conservative Parts and the Formation of the National Government', t5q-fit, and Ball, Baldwin, ! 71--4. Fora rather different. but still sceptical, verdict, see Marquand, ; 7s-8o. 
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are not just about the present and the immediately foreseeable 
future, but also about the middle- and long-term futures. They 
operate simultaneously across several time-scales, and the politics of 
what might happen are as important as the politics of what is 
happening. Occasionally, when the future appears unusually 
uncertain, a large disjunction between present politics and future 
politics may seem probable. The 'national crisis' perceived in 
autumn 1930 was such an occasion : it was actually one of anticipated 
crisis, a fear that something might go very badly wrong and require 
extraordinary measures. Political leaders hoped that matters would 
remain stable and that government and party politics would 
continue safely within the bounds of reasonable calculation. But 
alongside these hopes there co-existed a politics of extreme 
uncertainty about the future. This led some politicians to consider 
contingency plans, just in case drastic and politically difficult action 
became necessary. Such ideas could remain dormant, yet retain a 
latent relevance. Even so, when the idea of ' national government' 
did eventually enter current politics, it did so in an unexpected 
manner. 
The existence of 'national crisis' is a major theme of this book. 
Nevertheless the notions of 'national interest' or 'patriotism' are not 
offered as leading explanations for any of the responses to that 
condition. The difficulties of such notions are revealed by the fact 
that 'patriotism' can be used by one recent study to describe the 
actions of the Conservative leaders, and by another to describe those 
of Henderson. The same terminology might be applied to the Bank 
of England and the TUC, because during the 1931 crisis everyone 
saw themselves as acting patriotically, in the ' national interest'. 
What constituted this 'national interest' was itself central to the 
dispute. In contrast to the war crises of 191.5,1916, or 1940. no 
obvious agreed definition of the national interest existed. Defence of 
sterling might appear a strong candidate. Yet, if this makes 
Conservative leaders 'patriotic ' in August 1931. it would be difficult 
to apply the same description to them a month later. 
The point is not just that each party, institution, group, or 
individual had their own view of the national interest, but that each 
presumed an identity between their own higher interests and those 
of the nation. This book seeks to show how each tried to convert their 
own objectives into the policy of the nation, and how this competition 
issued in a major upheaval of politics and government. 
